Videos

No. 5vl0-vZ1e_io

What Did Kim Gu See in Pyongyang?

We were never taught what Kim Gu saw in Pyongyang. The received account says he crossed the 38th parallel to stop the partition. That is not wrong. He did oppose the separate election and the separate government, and he did cross. But the account leaves out what he brought back. Two months after returning, on 11 July 1948, the Chinese Minister at Seoul called on him unannounced and wrote down the conversation for his own government. The paper is marked "To Be Kept in Strict Secrecy." In it Kim Gu says the Korean Red Army cannot be matched by anything the South can build, and that "the Russians will easily set it on its southward swoop." Ten weeks earlier, the joint statement that carried his party's name had declared confidence that no civil war would follow a withdrawal. He was seventy-one; Kim Il-sung was thirty-six. Note: the narration is in Korean. English subtitles are available. The quotations are not translated back from Korean — they are restored from the English originals, so you can search them. ■ Sources · 'Record of Conversation between Kim Gu and Liu Yuwan,' July 11, 1948 — Wilson Center Digital Archive, Record ID 119630 · original repository: Syngman Rhee Institute, Yonsei University · Charles Kraus, 'Kim Koo on Reunification and War, 1948', NKIDP e-Dossier no. 19, Wilson Center, 2015 · FRUS, 1948, vol. VI, The Far East and Australasia — Korea, Documents 779 · 782 · 783 · 786 · 791 · 794 · 800 · 849 · National Institute of Korean History, ed., Sinpyon Han'guksa 52 — Suh Joong-suk, ch.3 sec.2 (4) · The Lebedev Memoranda 17·18 (Maeil Sinmun, 11 and 14 February 1995), cited in the above · National Institute of Korean History, 'Korean History through Historical Sources' — Joint Statement, April 1948 · Chosun Ilbo, 22 April 1948 · Paekpom Orok (Sasangsa, 1973), pp. 263–264 · Choi Song-bok, 'Impressions of the Pyongyang Negotiations', Sinch'onji, 1948 (issue no. to be confirmed), p. 67 · Hyundae Ilbo, 15 April 1948, p.2 — National Library of Korea, Korean Newspaper Archive, control_no CNTS-00069125245 · NARA RG 319, Entry 85A, ID File no. 573339 — 'Kim Koo: Background Information Concerning Assassination', 29 June / 1 July 1949 ■ Channel REPORTAGE KOREA — We check the received account against the primary documents and record honestly where they disagree. Every quotation and source is shown on screen and listed here. If you find a factual error, please tell us in the comments.

Sources 11·9 chapters·⚠ 1·0 comments

#Shorts4

No. 4k7gYVA2sOWU

1950 — The New Landowners

In 1945, 73 percent of South Korea's cultivated land was farmed by tenants, at a rent of about half the harvest. Ten years later that figure was in single digits. The received account says Syngman Rhee came to power on the backs of the landlords and so carried out no reform. That account is not a wiki invention — it is written, in those words, in a U.S. State Department document of December 1949. At that moment it was correct. Three months later a different document comes out of the same place. This film follows those three months, and then the summer that came after. Rhee's veto and what he actually objected to; how much land changed hands and how the numbers differ; what the North's own statute said about land it gave away "as eternal possession"; and why, in the occupied South in 1950, the U.S. Embassy found no evidence that farmers welcomed the communist land program. Note: the narration is in Korean. English subtitles are available. ■ Sources · FRUS, 1949, vol. VII, part 2, Document 304 (Butterworth to the Secretary of State, 16 Dec 1949) · FRUS, 1950, vol. VII, Document 17 (Muccio to the Secretary of State, 29 Mar 1950) · FRUS, 1950, vol. VII, Document 717 (Drumright to the Secretary of State, 28 Oct 1950) · Land Reform Act, Act No. 31 (21 June 1949) · amended by Act No. 108 (10 Mar 1950) · Law on Land Reform in North Korea, 5 March 1946 · CIA, Information Report, "Control of Rice in North Korea," CIA-RDP82-00457R005000530009-3, 15 June 1950 · James E. Ross and Riley H. Kirby, South Korea's Agricultural Economy, Economic Research Service, USDA, 1961 · Bruce Cumings, CWIHP Bulletin 6-7, p.121 · Origins of the Korean War, vol.2 (1990) The American documents are U.S. federal records and are freely readable online. ■ Channel REPORTAGE KOREA — We check the received account against the primary documents and record honestly where they disagree. Every quotation and source is shown on screen and listed here. If you find a factual error, please tell us in the comments.

Sources 8·10 chapters·0 comments

#Shorts4

No. 3DxZ19jtKTR8

Why Did Syngman Rhee Release 27,000 Anti-Communist POWs?

The 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty is usually remembered as something the United States gave to Korea. Open the documents that passed through Washington in those months and it reads differently. The United States did not want this treaty. It had also drawn up a plan to take President Rhee into custody — Operation EVERREADY. This film follows those few months using the U.S. State Department's own published record: the June 18 mass release of anti-communist prisoners, the National Security Council meeting that followed, the Robertson mission, and the treaty itself — read clause by clause. Note: the narration is in Korean. English subtitles are available. ■ Sources · FRUS 1952–54, Korea, vol. XV, Part 1, doc. 559 (State–JCS Meeting, 29 May 1953) · FRUS 1952–54, Korea, vol. XV, Part 2, doc. 606 · 607 · 609 · 640 · Mutual Defense Treaty between the ROK and the USA, 1 October 1953 (Avalon Project, Yale Law School) · Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front (US Army Center of Military History, 1966), Ch.11 "Koje-do" All are U.S. federal documents, freely readable online. ■ Channel REPORTAGE KOREA — We check the received account against the primary documents and record honestly where they disagree. Every quotation and source is shown on screen and listed here. If you find a factual error, please tell us in the comments.

Sources 11·8 chapters·⚠ 1·0 comments

#Shorts4

No. 2mvsAt-yUhp0

Why Did the President Turn the Train Around? — Korea, June 1950

Three scenes from the first four days of the Korean War are usually tied to one man: Syngman Rhee. He lied that Seoul was safe. He fled first. He blew the Han River bridge and abandoned 1.5 million people. Look for his name in the records, and at each of those places a different name comes up. · The phrase "Seoul is safe" appears nowhere in the FBIS monitoring transcripts. The announcement that kept citizens in the city came from ROK Army Headquarters. · Rhee refused to leave, was pushed out by his cabinet, and turned his train back north from Daegu. Four months later Kim Il-sung abandoned Pyongyang — the same act, called something else. · The order to blow the bridge is written down differently in every record. Only the officer who carried it out was executed — and acquitted on retrial thirteen years later. Source criticism is not about building heroes. It is about holding the received account against the record and marking honestly where they disagree. Note: the narration is in Korean. English subtitles are available. ■ Sources · FBIS Daily Report, 27 June 1950 (NARA RG 263) — restored broadcast, National Museum of Korean Contemporary History · Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (US Army CMH, 1961), Ch.3 and Ch.32 · ROK Army General Court-Martial, retrial decision on Col. Choi Chang-sik, 27 August 1963 · FRUS 1940 vol. II doc. 504 · FRUS 1941 vol. I doc. 865 ■ Channel REPORTAGE KOREA — We check the received account against the primary documents and record honestly where they disagree. Every quotation and source is shown on screen and listed here. If you find a factual error, please tell us in the comments.

Sources 6·5 chapters·⚠ 1·0 comments

#Shorts4