Why Did the President Turn the Train Around? — Korea, June 1950
세 장면, 한 사람의 이름
0:02세 장면, 한 사람의 이름Four in the morning, the twenty-fifth of June, 1950. The North Korean army crossed the 38th parallel.
And in three days, the capital, Seoul, fell.
This is what happened in those four days.
On the afternoon of the 26th, Uijeongbu was broken through.
At dawn on the 27th, the president left Seoul.
At two in the morning on the 28th, the Han River bridge was cut.
We mostly remember Rhee in those days like this.
He lied that Seoul was safe.
He left first, leaving the citizens behind.
He cut the Han River bridge and abandoned 1.5 million people.
Three scenes. And all three are tied to one man's name.
But look for that name in the records —
and at each of those places, a different name comes up.
Today we follow those names.
그 문장은 어디서 왔나
0:41그 문장은 그의 것이 아니었다"Seoul is safe. Do not panic."
It is said that such a broadcast went out on the radio in June 1950.
The citizens believed it and stayed; the president was already gone from Seoul. That is how the story set.
But there is something odd about this story.
Where it began —
who first wrote it down that way, and when — is hard to find.
If that broadcast really happened, it should be recorded somewhere.
As it happens, there was an outfit listening to Korean radio in full at the time.
The Foreign Broadcast Information Service of the United States. FBIS.
It transcribed what it monitored day by day and reported to Washington, and those transcripts survive.
Look in that record —
Rhee's broadcast is there.
But it was not made in Seoul. It was made on the night of the 27th, from Daejeon, where he had taken refuge.
"RHEE broadcast, 27 June. U.S. aid is on the way. MacArthur, Truman contacted."
"RHEE broadcast, 27 June. U.S. aid is on the way. MacArthur, Truman contacted."
Rhee broadcast, June 27. American aid is on the way, and he has contacted MacArthur and Truman.
The first Rhee broadcast in this record is that Daejeon broadcast of the 27th.
So whatever came out of the radio in Seoul —
even if the words "Seoul is safe" were in it,
it was not Rhee's voice.
And the phrase itself is confirmed nowhere in the transcripts.
Then where did the words that kept citizens in Seoul come from?
The record points somewhere else.
"The army will hold Seoul. Our forces are counterattacking now."
"The army will hold Seoul. Our forces are counterattacking now."
That announcement came from Army Headquarters.
Research by the ROK Institute for Military History records it as a false announcement.
It cites this announcement as the reason citizens stayed in Seoul without even preparing to flee.
That sentence is not in the president's broadcast.
The words that held the citizens were spoken by the army.
The one sentence stuck to Rhee's mouth for seventy years — was not his.
떠남
2:23떠난 것과 남긴 말은 다른 문제다The second thing stuck to his name is this.
"He ran away first."
That he left Seoul at dawn on the 27th is a fact.
The question is what came next. We have called it flight.
Before making that judgment, you have to see what kind of country this was.
Twenty-two months since the government was founded. Behind North Korea in military and economic strength.
Until the day before the war, the whole army was on leave.
The United States was no different.
In January 1950, five months before the war, Secretary of State Acheson announced a Pacific defense perimeter — and left Korea outside it.
Inside America there were voices for giving up the peninsula and making Japan the bridgehead.
The president of a twenty-two-month-old country was standing in that place.
The memoir written by his wife, Francesca, records the dawn of the war's second day.
We give her account of that scene as she wrote it.
Three in the morning on the 26th. The president telephoned General MacArthur in Tokyo. An aide-de-camp answered. He said he could not wake the general and would call back later.
Three in the morning on the 26th. The president telephoned General MacArthur in Tokyo. An aide-de-camp answered. He said he could not wake the general and would call back later.
The president flew into a rage and shouted, "American citizens in Korea are going to die one by one — so let your general sleep well."
The president flew into a rage and shouted, "American citizens in Korea are going to die one by one — so let your general sleep well."
I was so shocked that I put my hand over the receiver.
I was so shocked that I put my hand over the receiver.
The president was shaking. "Mommy, our people are dying bare-handed and they won't wake the commander — does that make any sense!" The man on the other end seemed to come to himself at the words that American citizens would die one by one, and said, "Your Excellency, please wait a moment," and then said he would wake General MacArthur.
The president was shaking. "Mommy, our people are dying bare-handed and they won't wake the commander — does that make any sense!" The man on the other end seemed to come to himself at the words that American citizens would die one by one, and said, "Your Excellency, please wait a moment," and then said he would wake General MacArthur.
The circumstances of this call are confirmed in American diplomatic documents as well.
Dawn on the 27th. The cabinet ministers rushed into the residence.
Your Excellency, you must leave Seoul.
The memoir gives his answer this way —
"No! Hold Seoul! I cannot leave!"
"No! Hold Seoul! I cannot leave!"
After the ministers pressed him, he boarded a train that dawn.
But after going as far as Daegu, he turned the train around.
It was in order to go back to Seoul.
"For the first time in my life I made the wrong call. I should never have come this far."
"For the first time in my life I made the wrong call. I should never have come this far."
But the northbound train stopped at Daejeon.
The broadcast we saw in chapter one — it came out of Daejeon that night.
He held out against leaving, was pushed out, and on the way down he turned back.
Can you call this man someone who ran away first?
Let us add: in wartime, a command moving out of the capital is basic military practice.
And Seoul was never terrain that could be held in the first place.
In the Imjin War and in the Manchu invasion, Seoul was abandoned.
Three months later, when Seoul was retaken, two North Korean divisions defended it — and could not hold a week.
In 1940 the French government left Paris,
and in 1941 the Soviet Union moved the functions of government east from Moscow.
And four months later, when UN forces drove north after the Inchon landing,
Kim Il-sung abandoned Pyongyang too. The North Korean government fell back to Kanggye.
The same act. And only one side is called flight.
What remains is not the leaving.
It is the words left behind in Seoul while he left.
"The army will hold Seoul. Our forces are counterattacking now."
"The army will hold Seoul. Our forces are counterattacking now."
The place those words came from was not him.
그 손은 누구의 것이었나
5:15그 손은 이승만의 것이 아니었다The third scene, and the heaviest.
The demolition of the Han River bridge.
This too is said to have been ordered by Rhee.
The bridge was blown at half past two on the morning of the 28th.
Look for where the order came from —
and each record names someone different.
Korean official histories point to Chae Byung-duk, the Army Chief of Staff.
But the official U.S. Army history writes it differently.
"General Kim told him that the Vice Minister of Defense had ordered the blowing of the bridges at 0130 and they must be blown at once."
"General Kim told him that the Vice Minister of Defense had ordered the blowing of the bridges at 0130 and they must be blown at once."
Chae himself denied that he had given the order.
In the U.S. Army account the chain runs from the Vice Minister of Defense, through General Kim, to Colonel Choi.
In the U.S. Army account the chain runs from the Vice Minister of Defense, through General Kim, to Colonel Choi.
The man who carried it out was Colonel Choi Chang-sik, chief of engineers. On this both records agree.
The American advisory group had asked that the bridge be blown later.
Troops and equipment still had to be pulled south.
That request was not honored.
At the moment of the blast there was no warning on the bridge.
"The best informed American officers in Seoul at the time estimate that between 500 and 800 people were killed or drowned in the blowing of this bridge."
"The best informed American officers in Seoul at the time estimate that between 500 and 800 people were killed or drowned in the blowing of this bridge."
The confirmed dead include 77 policemen of the Jongno police station.
The exact scale is still disputed.
And the main body of the Korean army north of the river lost its way out.
Colonel Choi, who carried out the order, was shot in September of that year.
The man who gave the order was never written down as one person,
but the man who received it died.
Thirteen years later a military court accepted his retrial.
And he was found not guilty.
The ground the decision rested on was this —
"an operational order from a superior carrying absolute binding force."
"an operational order from a superior carrying absolute binding force."
Following an order is not a crime — a justifiable act under the criminal code.
The received account remembers this scene as Rhee's.
But open the records, and the names in that place contradict one another.
One thing is certain. That hand was not Rhee's.
정직하게 남기기
6:54He lied, he left first, he cut the bridge.
The received account tied those three scenes into one man's story.
Open the records, and at each of those places there was a different name.
The sentence "Seoul is safe" is not in the transcripts, and the words that held the citizens came from Army Headquarters.
There is a record of him refusing to leave — and he did the same thing four months later in Pyongyang.
The order for the bridge points to a different man in every record, yet only the man who carried it out was shot.
The tragedy of that day is real. The severed bridge, the 1.5 million left north of the river.
Only the name attached to that tragedy does not match the record.
Source criticism is not about building heroes.
It is about holding the received account against the record, and marking honestly where they disagree.
There is no "what if" in history.
But we can remember a little more accurately.
Sources this film stands on · 6
- FRUS 1940, vol. II, Document 504Biddle 주프랑스 대리대사 → 국무장관 · 1940-06-14
- 대한민국역사박물관 현대사 기록영상 아카이브 「이승만 대통령 대전 라디오 연설 복원본」1950-06-27
- South to the Naktong, North to the YaluRoy E. Appleman · 1961
- 육군본부 보통군법회의 재심 결정·판결 (1963–1964) — 최창식 사건1963-08-27 / 1964-10-23
- 프란체스카, 「6·25와 이승만 대통령」, 『중앙일보』 1984.6.24 (및 비망록 단행본)프란체스카 도너 리 · 1984
- 남정옥, 「6·25전쟁과 이승만 대통령의 전쟁지도」, 『軍史』 제63호, 2007남정옥 · 2007-06